Center-State Political Transfer Cycles in India by Manjhi, Ganesh & Keswani Mehra, Meeta
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Center-State Political Transfer Cycles in
India
Ganesh Manjhi and Meeta Keswani Mehra
Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru
University
10 April 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70784/
MPRA Paper No. 70784, posted 19 April 2016 02:56 UTC
1 
 
 
 
Center-State Political Transfer Cycles in India
*
 
 
Ganesh Manjhi
†
           Meeta Keswani Mehra
‡
 
Date: April 10, 2016 
                                                          
* Acknowledgement: We are very thankful to the participants at IIT Delhi workshop on “Summer conference in 
Economics: Theory Meets Empirics-2016” for invaluable comments. We would like to thank Prof. Poonam Gupta 
and Mr. Honey Karun for timely help for the data. We are also very thankful to Dr. Abhijit Sen Gupta for his always 
ready-to-help approach anytime that we wanted it. 
†
 Assistant Professor, Gargi College, Delhi University and Research Scholar, Centre for International Trade and 
Development, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067. Email: 
ganeshtrx@gmail.com  
‡
 Professor of Economics, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New 
Delhi-110067. Email: meetakm@mail.jnu.ac.in  
2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to answer two basic questions -- first, whether an election affects the 
transfers to the states through different component heads such as - grants from the center, loan 
from the center, finance commission transfer and grants in aids. Secondly, whether different 
transfer variables and the characteristics of the incumbent government will be able to create the 
possibility of retaining the power? Using the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
methods (GMM) on a balanced panel data from 1980-2010 for 16 Indian states, we find that the 
right wing and coalition government is less likely to transfer the resources to the states. 
However, the state level ruling party which is either the same party at the center or ally get more 
transfers from the center than a non-coalition ruling party. Unlike the political budget cycles in 
the most literatures, the political transfer cycle is visible in the post-election period, which 
supports the possibility that while the announcements and promises are made before the election, 
the actual realization is observed only after the election. This may also be on account of 
attracting votes in the legislative assembly elections at the state level. The paper is extended to 
the logit and probit specifications of the model. It is found that; higher voters‟ turnout in the state 
is more likely to win the election. Further, inflation reduces the possibility of winning the 
election, whereas more experienced government has a higher probability of winning the election. 
Moreover, our result also show that, the right wing government is more likely to win the election 
as they also behave more opportunistically and the coalition government where states are its 
allies lowers the possibility of winning the election.  
 
 
JEL Classification: D72, E62, H72 
 
Keywords: Opportunist Incumbent; Political Budget Cycle, Political Transfer Cycle, Indian 
Federation. 
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1. Background 
In a federal structure, the central government has the incentive, as also the capability, to 
manipulate the transfers given to the states (provinces/sub national jurisdictions) so as to enhance 
the possibility of winning the national election. This very idea is based on the concept of political 
budget cycle, which asserts that the incumbent can opportunistically manipulate the fiscal policy 
to increase the possibility of winning the election (see Manjhi and Mehra (2016) for a theoretical 
exposition of this issue). In the similar vein, we can call it the center-state political transfer cycle 
(PTC) and pose the question --whether the national incumbent government can strategically 
transfer the resources? Also, whether by transferring the resources she/ he can increase the 
chances of winning the election and form the government?   
Since, the publication of the seminal paper by Nordhaus (1975), the literature on political 
business cycle has been enriched considerably. Nordhaus (1975) considered an opportunistic pre-
electoral manipulation of economic policies (that is, inflation-unemployment cycles) by the 
incumbent to raise the chances of getting re-elected, whereas, Hibbs (1977) explained the post-
electoral cycles due to varied macroeconomic goals of policy makers, popularly known as 
partisan cycles. In fact, a large part of the literature on PBC covers the analysis where an 
incumbent is either opportunist or partisan under two alternative situations of adaptive and 
rational expectation of citizen voters. It is also quite possible that an incumbent can act as an 
opportunist prior to election and work otherwise after winning the election to meet partisan goals 
(Frey and Schneider, 1978).  
From Nordhaus (1975), the brief forty years history of political business cycle moved on to 
political budget cycle (PBC) propounded by Rogoff (1990) and further extended by Drazen 
(2000), where the latter two works cover the fiscal/ budget components in detail and not just the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off cycle based on the Phillips curve. The most recent strand of 
work incorporates the possibility of signaling and competency in a model of PBC, which can be 
attributed to Rogoff (1990), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Persson and Tabellini (1990), Aidt, Veiga 
and Veiga (2011) and Manjhi and Mehra (2016). Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
show how the budget cycle can occur in the presence of rational voters, where voters are less 
informed about the complexities of the government  budget. So, the government can signal its 
competency by focusing more on the expenditure on visible public good (consumption good) and 
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assign lower priority to the investment expenditure, and thus increase the chances of winning the 
election. The remaining papers obtain similar results, though Persson and Tabellini (1990) add 
the concept of competency in its analysis, whereas Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) analyze that 
incumbent signals its competency by spending more on visible public goods a year before to 
election to gain the voting support. Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) also derive that a lower victory 
margin in the last election makes the incumbent more opportunists in the current period.  Shi and 
Svensson (2002a) postulate the PBC phenomenon as a moral hazard problem where the 
incumbent takes the advantage of asymmetry of information by signaling the competency before 
the election through fiscal policy of producing public goods without raising taxes. Manjhi and 
Mehra (2016) suggest that incumbent gets higher voting support in case of both -- opportunist 
and partisan behavior, but reject the same when there is strong anti-incumbency in the former. 
Hence, opportunism is good for incumbent to win the election but costly for the economy as a 
whole.    
There also exist empirical literatures on the subject. Shi and Svensson (2002b) used a panel of 
123 countries for a period of 1975-1995 and find some evidence of PBC among developing 
counties whereas Alesina et. al. (1997) find evidence of these cycles on the aggregate fiscal 
variables but no evidence of cycles in any single budget component for a sample of 13 OECD 
countries over the period 1960-1993. In a sample of 60 democracies over the period of 1960-
1980, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a revenue cycle, but no political cycle of spending or 
transfers. They also find that, while all democratic systems display cycles before the elections, 
only presidential systems show evidence of fiscal adjustments after elections. Brender and 
Drazen (2005) find PBC only in new democracies. Efthyvoulou (2012) finds a stronger evidence 
of PBC among the European Union countries as compared to those who are not yet the part of 
the union of European countries over the period 1997-2008.  
Since, the focus of our analysis is the center-state transfer of funds, a discussion on some studies 
in this regard is in order.  Kroth (2012) used a panel dataset of 9 provinces of Africa over the 
period 1995-2010 and derived two important results. First, provinces where the national ruling 
party faces greater electoral competition receive higher per capita transfers in the year before an 
election. Second, this increase is driven by the conditional grant, which is the non-formula-based 
component of the total inter-governmental transfer. Khemani (2004), shows that the electoral 
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budget cycle affects the composition of local budgets. That is, Indian state governments do not 
manipulate aggregate fiscal variables such as total spending or deficits in the run-up to an 
election, but that they manipulate individual budget items and public investment projects. The 
evidence of local budget cycle can also be found in Reid (1998) and Kneebone and McKenzie 
(2001) for the Canadian provinces. Drazen and Eslava (2003) bring descriptive evidence of a 
significant increase of investments prior to elections in local governments in Colombia, an 
increase which is only partially compensated by a decrease in government consumption. Alesina 
and Paradisi (2014) find a strong PBC, particularly for South of Italy using a „lower tax‟ regime 
close to the election whereas Baskaran, Brender, Blesse and Reingewertz (2016) find that a low 
share of revenue raised by Israeli local municipalities budget creates excessive dependence on 
central government transfers, and hence the PBC; however, tightening of the monitoring 
eliminates these. Sengupta (2011) states that federal welfare may actually increase with 
politically motivated transfers and the state ruled by the same government as the center transfer 
more grants to the favorite province and hence more public good. 
Figure 1: Deviational transfers in different years in the tenure 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy.  
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The prime motivation underlying this work is the observed announcements of transfer packages 
and actual transfers operated by the centre to the states prior to and after the elections in Indian 
federal structure. Figure 1 depicts these transfers in an opportunistic form for different years 
(namely, all years, year of election, year before election, year and year before election, year after 
election, non-election years) in the electoral tenure. The opportunistic transfers have also been 
shown in the specific context where the state-level ruling party is an ally of the center and also 
when it is not allied. Some interesting points to note are --- on the aggregate, the allied state 
ruling party gets higher transfers from the center (Arulampalam et. al., 2009). They find that a 
state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher 
transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing. Further, the year of election and the year 
before the election always exhibit lower transfers to the states irrespective of whether the state 
party is allied or non-allied. Contrary to the common belief on PBC, where fiscal policy is 
expansionary one year prior to election, Figure 1, states that year of election and year before to 
election has relatively less transfers than the non-election years (that is, except the year of 
election and year before). The only variable that has a different behavior is Loan from the center 
(Lfc). The Lfc is always deviated positively from the average; particularly for year before to the 
election and to the allied. However, Lfc has negatively deviated (less relative transfer) to the non-
allied overall and less transfers in the non-election years.      
An additional motivation for undertaking this work is that, so far, a bulk of research has been 
done for the advanced economies and not much for developing countries, particularly at the sub-
national level, which is an obvious lacuna. More specifically, the analysis of PBC has been 
largely attempted for advanced countries, and more so with focus on various fiscal heads of 
financing the expenditure and collecting revenue through tax. However, hardly any of the work 
refers to the center-state political transfer cycles as this research that is attempted for India. In 
this respect, this study fills an important gap in the literature. This study is also interesting in the 
sense that it analyzes, in the context of widespread prevalence of caste and religion based politics 
in the country, whether transfers are an important determinant of the electoral outcomes? Figure 
1 provides an indication of presence of opportunistic behaviour of politicians, particularly for the 
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allied parties at the state level.
4
 It can be seen that the opportunistic transfer is more to the allied 
than otherwise in the year of election and one year before to election.     
Here, we focus on the center-state political transfer cycles (PTC), a concept similar to that of 
PBC. In general, fiscal variables in a federal context can be expected to follow an expansionary 
trend before the election. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the structure of cycles tends to 
differ in case of centre-state transfers unlike the other fiscal variables. The analysis is also 
extended to look at whether the expansion of transfers in the year prior to the election is higher 
or lower if the party in the state is in the alliance of the centre or not?  
The remaining sections are as follows. Section 2 covers a brief description of the Indian federal 
structure. The data and methods as well as the tracing of the PTC are presented in Section 3. 
Section 4, discussed the key results. Finally Section 5 concludes as well as prescribes the policy 
recommendations. 
  
2. Structure of the Fiscal Federalism in India 
The structure of the Indian federalism comprises three tiers – center, state and panchayat/ 
municipality. In the Constitution of India, the Union of India has been discussed much more, 
notwithstanding that it has a connotation similar to the federal structure. On several occasions, 
states have sought for higher autonomy, but the center has tried to maintain its supremacy. The 
panchayati raj system was just a utopian concept of “gram sabha (village councils) as the 
highest” (concept of gram swaraj) visualized by Mahatma Gandhi before independence, which 
could never actually took shape in reality. Effectively, center has always maintained the supreme 
authority in most of the decision making process even in the defined power structure. In fact, in 
some cases, center has gone to amend the constitution as well to move items from the state list to 
the concurrent list and thus increase the center‟s share of spending (Gulati and George, 1985). 
Also, as one move into the neo-classical liberal framework of economic development, most 
countries, such as China, Brazil, Argentina and Russia, are moving towards a federal structure of 
centripetal kind, whereas some big federations, such as Canada, United States and Australia are 
                                                          
4
 Opportunism =(Reference year value-Average of the remaining four years in a tenure) 
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more of a centrifugal type. India seems to have commonality with the former group. India has 
shifted from a centralized quasi-federation to a co-operative and competitive structure of the 
center-state power relationship down the line. The first three decades after independence till the 
late 1980s can be traced as phase of the centralized federation in India. Later, the post reform era 
is broadly known as that of cooperative-cum-competitive federation. This phenomenon is 
supported by the idea of a coalitional structure of the government as well, which came into 
existence effectively in the early 1990s. That is, the state government that happens to be an ally 
of the central government would mostly co-operate whereas; the non-allied ones would tend to 
compete. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze whether the center‟s coalitional allies at the 
state is allied opportunistically or on partisanship basis (not covered explicitly).  
This paper attempts to analyze whether, in the federal structure, transfers under various heads to 
the states have been operated opportunistically by the central government or not? That is, 
whether there is expansion in the transfer from the center to the states prior to the election or not? 
Also, whether the opportunistically created transfer cycles impact the electoral outcome at the 
center? 
3. Tracing the Political Transfer Cycle 
3.1. Data and Methods 
We utilize a balanced panel of the 16 Indian states, excluding the newly born states such as 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, as well as some additional states where regular 
elections did not take place, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram, Jammu and Kashmir. 
Also, except Assam North-East states are dropped from the sample. The PTC model relies on the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation methods of estimating the equation by taking the 
sample data from 1980 to 2010. The election data have been taken from the Election Commission 
of India and from myneta.info. The fiscal variables have been taken from the Reserve Bank of 
India and the Ministry of Finance, Government of India.  
The interesting question to be posed here is whether and how centre-state fiscal transfers will be 
affecting the national level election outcomes. The national level election (general election) can 
be influenced by transfers operated from the center to states on account of wooing the voters one 
year prior to election. The focus of the paper is on transfers of resources from center to state 
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through various means, such as grants from the center (Gfc), loan from the center (Lfc), grants in 
aids (Gia), finance commission transfer (Fct) and gross devolution and transfer of resources from 
the center (Gd_tr). The key question for which an answer is sought is whether these fiscal 
variables are electorally motivated?  
Based on the method by Klomp and Haan (2013), we are first interested in analyzing whether 
fiscal decisions by the incumbent are affected by the election year or the year before the election. 
Following Klomp and Haan (2013), the structure of the equation is postulated to be:  
𝑇𝑣𝑖𝑡     =    𝜋0𝑇𝑣𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜋1𝑇𝑣𝑖(𝑡−2) + 𝜋2 𝑃𝑖_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋3𝐶𝑙_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋4𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜋5𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋6𝑌𝑟_𝑎𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋7𝑌𝑟_𝑏_𝑖𝑛𝑡2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋8𝑌𝑟_𝑎_𝑖𝑛𝑡3𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋9𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝜋10𝑁𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                          (1) 
where, 𝑇𝑣𝑖𝑡  refers to the fiscal component which could be any of the following variables - grants 
from the center (Gfc), loan from the center (Lfc), grants in aids (Gia), finance commission 
transfer (Fct) and gross devolution and transfer of resources from the center (Gd_tr). The 
variables 𝑇𝑣𝑖(𝑡−1)  and 𝑇𝑣𝑖(𝑡−2) are the lagged dependent variable, which is expected to affect 
the dependent variable auto-regressively, so we expect 𝜋0 > 0, 𝜋1 > 0. The binary variable 
𝑃𝑖_𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1, if the incumbent is of right wing and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐶𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1 if the 
incumbent government is a coalition and is 0 otherwise. The right wing government is mostly 
expected to behave opportunistically, hence they will speak more often about the transfers 
through media and different mode of adverts but actual transfers will be less and will tend to 
transfer less to the states irrespective of whether the state is its ally or not. In fact, the 
announcement of Rs. 1.65 lakh crore by the current NDA government prior to 2015 assembly 
election in Bihar is the close example of such opportunistic behavior, which latter been declined 
by the cental government after losing the election.
5
 Hence 𝑃𝑖_𝐷𝑢𝑚 is expected to be 𝜋2 < 0. 
Similarly, if there is a coalition government at the centre, each coalition members will work in its 
own and the regions‟ interest, and hence the government will not be able to work with its full 
efficiency; so, 𝜋3 < 0. The dummy variable 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1, if the coalition government exists at 
                                                          
5
 Announcement of package for Bihar on 18
th
 August, 2015 and the assembly election in Bihar is on 29
th
 November 
2015. http://www.business-standard.com/article/elections/modi-announces-rs-1-25-lakh-crore-package-for-poll-
bound-bihar-115081801022_1.html 
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the center and state level ruling party is the same party as center or allied to the central 
government and will be 0 otherwise; we expect that 𝜋4 > 0. Some more binary variables are 
𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1 if it‟s a year before election and 0 otherwise and 𝑌𝑟_𝑎𝑓_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1, if it is a 
year after election and 0 otherwise. Consequently, 𝜋5 > 0 and  𝜋6 < 0.  In some of the cases one 
might observe the year after election effect as well; so, the possibility of 𝜋6 > 0 can not be 
ignored. The two additional dummies that are considered are denoted by 𝑌𝑟_𝑏_𝑖𝑛𝑡2 = 1, if there 
is coalition government at the center, the state ruling party is the partner and it is the year before 
the election and 0 otherwise, and  𝑌𝑟_𝑎_𝑖𝑛𝑡3 = 1, if there is coalition government at the center, 
state ruling party is the partner and year after election and 0, otherwise. We expect that, 𝜋7 > 0 
and 𝜋8 < 0.  A higher density of population tends to entail more state-level spending; (as 
population itself is one of the criteria of transfers from the center), implying 𝜋9 > 0. The higher 
the number of years of experience, the better the government will be to able to handle the 
finances transferred and manage the budgetary balance, such that 𝜋10 > 0.   
Eq. (1) has been estimated to see whether and how different variants of fiscal transfers are 
affected by the independent variables including the election years. Notably, the PTC has been 
captured by the difference between the estimated error term of the Eq. (1) without the election 
dummy variables (both year before and after the election) and the error term with these election 
variables now included in the estimation. The pattern of the state wise transfer cycles are shown 
in the diagrams included in Appendix A.   
3.2. Results 
Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics for all the transfer variables in level as well as in 
the deviation form.
6
 Apart from this, the section compiles the basic statistics for some other 
variables, namely, Inflation (Infs), Density, political ideology (Pi_Dum) and Coalition binary 
(Cl_Dum). India has experienced around 7% inflation on an average during the analysis period 
(1980-2010), whereas in some cases, it goes as high as 53% at the state level and as low a level 
of deflation as -3.31%. In the post 1980 period, most of the time we have had a coalition 
government that has been ruled mostly by a left-of-the-centre government.      
                                                          
6
 This is the opportunistic deviation as defined earlier. 
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The results of the estimation are shown in Table 2. Since, we are expecting auto-regressive 
transfer variables; therefore the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable was inevitable along 
with some pre-determined and binary variables. We have used the Arellano-Bond dynamic 
panel-data estimation method (a variant of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)). In our 
estimation, the dependent variable refers to different variants (components) of the fiscal transfers 
to the states by central government, namely, grants from the center (Gfc), loan from the center 
(Lfc), grants in aids (Gia), finance commission transfer (Fct) and gross devolution and transfer of 
resources from the center (Gd_tr), as also discussed earlier.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Gfc 
12.68261 9.20856 2.81780 50.93946 
Lfc 
10.14599 7.17808 0.00886 39.08477 
Gia 
12.46436 8.99971 2.81780 50.89771 
Fct 
28.62757 13.43261 6.52570 71.57381 
Gdtr 
38.97560 15.30179 9.19105 86.41259 
Gfc_d* 
0.00177 3.15628 -15.33163 17.83400 
Lfc_d* 
0.00015 2.90740 -11.18330 11.22522 
Gia_d* 
0.01450 3.08781 -15.32674 17.85039 
Fct_d* 
0.00003 4.06405 -22.98479 18.78804 
Gdtr_d* 
0.00002 4.75703 -28.37362 18.49306 
Infs 
7.444023 4.817744 -3.31864 53.0634 
Density 
396.8215 243.1966 76.89545 1023.640 
Cl_Dum 
0.705645 0.456212 0.00000 1.0000 
Pi_Dum 
0.193548 0.395478 0.00000 1.0000 
Note- all variables with „*‟ is in opportunistic form.  
We notice that the lagged dependent variables are highly significant in all the cases except the 
second-order lag for the finance commission transfer. Two prominent results which are as 
expected and significant across the transfer variables are Pi_Dum and Cl_Dum. That is, a right 
wing government exhibits the tendency to transfer less to the states. Similarly, the coalition 
government also generally transfers less to the states because, in a country like India, central 
government functions under various political constraints and that might not be favorable for the 
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incumbent. However, if the state ruling party is the coalition partner (Clal_Dum=1) then the 
transfer is positive in all the cases, but is significant only with grants from the center and grants- 
in-aids. So, this points to the possibility of higher transfer as grants for the state ruling coalition 
partner from the center.      
Unlike in a case of the normal budgetary cycle in fiscal deficit, we find a negative year before 
election effect in all but loan from the center (Lfc) and gross devolution and transfer of resources 
from the center (Gd_tr), where the coefficient is found to be positive. Loan from the center is 
positive and significant, whereas Gd_tr is positive but not significant. Since, loan has to be 
repaid back; it does not seem difficult to transfer the loan to the states before the election, 
whereas other variables such as Gfc, Gia and Fct are as per the finance commission‟s 
recommendations, where at most what the incumbent government can do is to announce the 
package before the election but the actual transfer takes place after the election.
7
 As we can see 
from Table 2, except in case of loan from the center (Lfc), all the variables are having positive 
and significant after the election coefficient. Thus, the after election effect appears to be very 
strong in terms of transfer.    
Further, the interaction binary variables of coalition government at the center, year before 
election and state ruling party being the coalition partner is denoted by Yr_b_int2. Similarly, the 
coalition government at the center, year after election and state ruling party being the coalition 
partner has been denoted by Yr_a_int3. However, both Yr_b_int2 and Yr_a_int3 are found to be 
negative and insignificant, except in the equation for Lfc in the latter case. That is, a coalition 
government does not extend higher transfers even to the coalition partner around the election; 
however these two interactive binaries are not significant to be conclusive.  
The remaining two variables are Density and number of years of experience of the party (Nypp), 
where higher density states will require more transfer and population will be one of the criteria 
for getting higher transfer given the Indian federal structure. Lfc is negative and significant 
whereas Gd_tr is negative but insignificant. The rest of the variables such as - gfc, gia and fct are 
positively transferred in the high density states but are not significant. Similarly, Nypp is positive 
                                                          
7
 Announcement of Rs. 1.65 lakh crore package for Bihar on 18
th
 August, 2015 and the assembly election in Bihar is 
on 29
th
 November 2015. http://www.business-standard.com/article/elections/modi-announces-rs-1-25-lakh-crore-
package-for-poll-bound-bihar-115081801022_1.html 
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and significant in case of gfc, gia and fct but negative in Lfc and Gd_tr. It is significant only in 
the case of Lfc that is, more experienced government will be properly managing the gfc, gia and 
fct but will consistently discourage the state to get loans from the center may be because of its 
repayment obligations.          
Table 2: Dependent variables are different components of transfers   
Variables 
Gfc Lfc Gia Fct Gd_tr 
(1) (2)       (3) (4) (5) 
Dep.var(-1) 
0.391 
[8.10]*** 
0.483 
[10.5]*** 
0.395 
[8.19]*** 
0.455 
[9.46]*** 
0.428 
[9.23]*** 
Dep.var(-2) 
0.120 
[2.57]*** 
0.221 
[4.81]*** 
0.100 
[2.10]** 
0.013 
[0.29] 
0.177 
[3.89]*** 
Pi_dum 
-1.186 
[-1.74]* 
-2.256 
[-2.92]*** 
-1.222 
[-1.78]** 
-3.235 
[-3.54]*** 
-5.548 
[-4.65]*** 
Cldum 
-1.099 
[-2.31]** 
-1.570 
[-2.85]*** 
-1.248 
[-2.62]*** 
-1.079 
[-1.70]* 
-2.649 
[-3.19]*** 
Clal_Dum 
0.856 
[1.68]* 
0.426 
[0.72] 
1.031 
[2.02]** 
0.324  
[0.48] 
0.596 
[0.69] 
Yr_bf_elect 
-0.131 
[-0.37] 
1.660 
[3.94]*** 
-0.560 
[-1.56] 
-1.579 
[-3.30]*** 
0.619 
[1.00] 
Yr_af_elect 
1.002 
[2.67]*** 
-0.194 
[-0.44] 
1.310 
[3.49]*** 
2.590 
[5.19]*** 
1.517 
[2.34]** 
Yr_b_int2 
-0.508 
[-0.65] 
-0.482 
[-0.54] 
-0.461 
[-0.59] 
0.876 
[0.86] 
0.073 
[0.06] 
Yr_a_int3 
0.253 
[0.34] 
-1.799 
[-2.09]** 
-0.113 
[-0.15] 
-0.493 
[-0.51] 
-1.608 
[-1.27] 
Density 
0.004 
[1.28] 
-0.013 
[-2.88]*** 
0.003 
[0.76] 
0.014 
[2.82]*** 
-0.004 
[-0.58] 
Nypp 
0.025 
[1.59] 
-0.045 
[-2.39]** 
0.016 
[0.97] 
0.023 
[1.10] 
-0.034 
[-1.20] 
#Obs. 448 448 448 448 448 
Wald 
chi2(13) 
252.37 1352.69 221.54 318.75 630.27 
Sargan Test 
Chi2(371) 
402.68 
[0.124] 
394.08 
[0.196] 
404.61 
[0.110] 
395.38 
[0.184] 
371.08 
[0.488] 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-statistics in the parenthisis). Sargan Test- H0: 
overidentifying restrictions are valid (p-values in the parentheses). 
To trace the transfer cycle graphically, we estimated the above equation without the election year 
dummies (for year before and after the election) and another equation with these election years 
included. The residuals of the two estimates have been correspondingly subtracted to get the 
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transfers cycles. The resulting graph as cycles has been shown in Figures 1a to 1e in appendix A. 
The graph displays a pattern similar to what the empirical results suggest. 
4. Effect of Transfers on Electoral Outcome  
Using the same dataset as above, again for 16 states, covering the general elections in India 
spanning the period 1980 to 2010, we attempted to estimate the equation of electoral outcome. 
We take different transfer variables as the independent variable along with other binary and 
exogenous variables.  
4.1. Method of Estimation 
The equation that follows is a binary variable where the victory of the incumbent is defined state 
wise. The binary variable has been defined in the following way:  
𝐸𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓   
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑊𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑊𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
> 0
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
The estimable form of equation in the logit and probit framework is as follows: 
𝐸𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛤0 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛤1 𝑂𝑝𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛 ∗ 𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑡  +  𝛤2(𝑂𝑝𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛 ∗
𝑌𝑟_𝑎𝑓_𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝛿2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡+𝛿3𝑃𝑖_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡+ 
𝛿4𝐶𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛿7𝑁𝑦𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                        
(2) 
where, i = 1, 2, 3……16, indicates the index of states and t indicate the times series in years. The 
equation includes state fixed effects (𝜃𝑖) and election year fixed effects (𝛾𝑡). The random variable 
is 𝜀𝑖𝑡  which is assumed as E(𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,)=0. Our prime objective is to estimate the equation for electoral 
outcome (𝐸𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒), where the dependent variable (𝐸𝑙_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) is defined as the state 
wise win-margin of the national level election from the incumbent versus the opponent. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 variable has been used to denote as gfc, lfc, gia, fct and Gd_tr, each in a separate 
equation, and their respective coefficients in the corresponding equations will be represented by 
𝛤0 and expected to be positive in each case. The variable 𝑂𝑝𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛 ∗ 𝑌𝑟_𝑏𝑓_𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  is the 
interaction term of the opportunistic transfers of each type and year before election and 
𝑂𝑝𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛 ∗ 𝑌𝑟_𝑎𝑓_𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 is the interaction term of the opportunistic transfers and year after the 
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election. Generally, a higher voter turnout is expected to boot out the incumbent, but the sign of 
this variable can be expected to be ambiguous; that is 𝛿1 ≷ 0. A higher inflation will tend to 
have a negative effect on the general election, hence 𝛿2 < 0. In case of the right wing 
government, 𝑃𝑖_𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1, will tend to be more opportunist, and hence the possibility of winning 
the election will be higher; that is, 𝛿3 > 0. The coalition government 𝐶𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1 is always 
difficult to carry forward in India; hence we can have ambiguous expected sign 𝛿4 ≷ 0. 
However, the coalition government where the state ruling party is its ally can have a higher 
probability of winning the election, and the expected sign of the variable 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝑢𝑚, will be 
positive; that is, 𝛿5 > 0. A higher level of the 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 at the states level and more experienced 
(𝑁𝑦𝑝𝑝) the incumbent government is, there is higher possibility of winning the election because 
a higher density population can be mobilized faster through various means of advertisement 
about the transfers and more experience government can better handle the management. 
Therefore, 𝛿6 > 0 and 𝛿7 > 0.  
Results 
Table a(i) to a(v) report the results of the regression where the dependent variable is a binary of 
victory (difference between the seats won by incumbent and seats won by opponent divided by 
the total number of parliamentary seats in the state), and the remaining variables have been used 
as the independent variables.  Tables a(i) to a(v) respectively present the estimation results for 
the following transfer variables – Gfc, Lfc, Gia, Fct and Gd_tr. The results in Table a(i) suggest 
that a higher turnout creates a more likely situation for an incumbent to win the election, whereas 
inflation is found to be costly for the incumbent in terms of losing the election. In fact, inflation 
caused by basic food items, such as increased onion prices indeed brought tears in Delhi 
assembly election for the incumbent BJP in 1998 when they lost the power to Congress. For 
much the same reason congress hardly manage to retain the power in 2010 election. The Density 
and Gfc are found to be negative but not significant; that is, higher population density and grants 
do not guarantee a likely victory by the incumbent.  Unlike the expected effect, the variable Gfc 
in the year before to the election is less likely to, while post election year is more likely to win 
the election, albeit both are found to be insignificant explanatory variables. So, effectively, the 
year before election grants is not de facto politically driven; rather it‟s quite possible that the 
announcement and promise might have been done before the election but actual realizations are 
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observed only after the election. An opportunistic manipulation prior to election is more likely to 
win the election and less likely in the post election, but not found significant in case of both. 
Though, in most of the cases, a rightwing incumbent has a higher likelihood of winning the 
election, while a coalition incumbent runs a lower likelihood of the same. The state ruling party 
who is also the allied to the central government is less likely to win the election.  
In fact, the variables which are consistently having the same effect across the results are 
percentage of voters‟ turnout, inflation, density, Nypp, Pi-Dum, Cl_Dum and Clal_dum. Results 
are different only with respect to the different variants of the transfer variables included in the 
regression. Table a(ii) provides the effect of loan from the center. Loan from the center 
negatively affects the possibility of victory, and hence Lfc is less likely to help the incumbent to 
win the election, albeit post-election it is more likely to help the win but has an insignificant 
effect. The opportunistic manipulation of the Lfc prior to election is less likely to win the 
election, whereas post election it is more likely to help the win. It means, as in previous case of 
Gfc in Table a(i), Lfc has been announced or promised before the election but de facto it is 
implemented after the election.   
Grants in aids in Table a(iii) depict similar effects as grants from the center. That is, level of Gia 
is less likely to win the election for the incumbent, however it is not found to be significant. 
Similarly, the year before election grant is less likely to win the election. However, post-election 
level values and the year before the election opportunistic manipulations of Gia are more likely 
to win the election, though these are also not found to be significant variables. The year after 
election opportunistic manipulations of Gia is also not significant.   
Finance commission transfer, as shown in Table a(iv), are less likely to win the election for the 
incumbent, however, again it is not significant. The most interesting finding here is a PTC in Fct. 
That is opportunistic manipulation of Fct year before the election is likely to win the election for 
the incumbent and this is highly significant. Unlike the other variables, such as Gfc, Lfc, and Gia, 
the year after election opportunism of Fct is less likely to win the election though it is not 
significant.      
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Gross devolution and transfer of resources from the center has more likely to win the election 
though it is not significant. Also the opportunism around the election period is more likely to win 
the election but it is not significant.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The transfer components are mostly explained itself auto-regressively. A right wing and coalition 
government is less likely to transfer the resources to the states. However, a state ruling party 
which is also a coalition partner is likely to get more transfer from the center. Justifying the post 
election PTC is quite challenging that too when the pre-electoral fiscal expansion budget cycle is 
dominant in the literature. That is, in most cases, unlike a distinct political budget cycle (PBC)
8
, 
the PTC traces cycle year after the election. In fact, the outcomes in case of the PTC are different 
from the conventional PBC. Specifically, we find that there is post-election budget cycle, which 
signifies the possibility that while the announcements and promises are made before the election, 
the actual realization (or operation of transfer) is observed immediately after the election.       
In the second part of the paper, in the logit and probit specification of the model, we find that a 
higher voters‟ turnout in the state is more likely to win the election. Inflation reduces the 
possibility of winning the election, whereas a more experienced government has higher 
probability of winning the election. Similarly, a right wing government is more likely to win the 
election, whereas the presence of a coalition government where states are its allies reduces the 
possibility of winning the election. The opportunistic pre-electoral expansion of the finance 
commission transfer is the only factor which increases the possibility of winning the election for 
the incumbent government. The remaining transfer variables such as Gfc, Lfc, Gia, Gdtr are 
mostly affecting positively during the election though not significant.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 This is analyzed in another paper by the authors. 
18 
 
References  
Aidt, T. S., Veiga, F. J. and L.G. Veiga (2011), “Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A 
new test of the rational political Business Cycle model”, Public Choice, 148: 21-44. 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and G. D. Cohen, (1997), “Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy”, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Alesina, A., and M. Paridisi, 2014, “Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from the Italian Cities”, 
NBER Working Paper 20570  
Bagchi, A. (2003), “Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations between the center and 
and the States”, Publius, Vol. 33, No.04, Emerging Federal Process in India, pp.21-42. 
Baskaran, T., Brender, A., Blesse, S. and Reingewertz, Y. (2016), “Revenue Decentralisation, 
central oversight  and the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from the Israel”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 42, pp.1-16  
Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2005), “Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established 
Democracies.” NBER Working Paper 10539 
Brender, A. and A. Drazen, 2013. “Elections, Leaders, and the Composition of Government 
Spending”, Journal of Public Economics, Vo. 97, Issue-1, 18-31 
Chakraborty, Pinaki. 2003. “Unequal Fiscal Capacities Across India States: How Corrective is 
the Fiscal Transfer Mechanism?” National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, mimeo 
 Drazen, A., 2000. “The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years”, Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth 
Rogoff (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2000, MIT Press, Volume 15,  75-138. 
 Drazen, A. and M. Eslava, 2010. “Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition: theory 
and evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 92, 39-52. 
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012), “Political Budget Cycles in the European Union and the impact of 
political pressures”, Public Choice, Vol. 153, pp. 295-327.  
Hibbs, D. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 1467-1487. 
Khemani, S. (2004), “Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effect of Elections in the 
Indian States”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 125-154. 
19 
 
Frey, B. S. and F. Schneider, 1978. “A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom”, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 80, No. 350, pp. 243-253.  
 Kneebone, R. and K. McKenzie (2001), “Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An 
Examination of Canadian Provinces,” International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 
753-774.  
Klomp, J and J. de Haan (2013), “Political budget cycle and election outcomes”, Public Choice, 
Vol. 157, pp. 245-267. 
Kroth, V. (2012), Political budget cycles and intergovernmental transfers in a dominant party 
framework: empirical evidence from South Africa, Political Science and Political 
Economy Working Paper, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, No. 
6/2012 
Lalvani, M. (1999), “Elections and Macropolicy Signals: Political Budget Cycle Hypothesis”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 37, pp. 2676-2681. 
Lalvani, M. (2008), “Demonstrating a „New Political Budget Cycle‟”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 15, pp. 25-28. 
Manjhi, G and M.K. Mehra, (2016), “Dynamics of Political Budget Cycle”, NIPFP Working 
Paper, no. 163. 
Nordhaus, W. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 42, pp. 
169-90. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, (1990), “Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics”, 
London: Hardwood Academy Publishers. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, (2000), “Political Economics, Explaining Economic Policy, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, (2003) Do Electoral Cycles differ across Political Systems? CEPR 
Working Paper Series, No. 232. 
Reid, B. G. (1998), Endogenous elections, electoral budget cycles and Canadian provincial 
governments, Public Choice, Vol. 97, Issue 1-2, pp 35-48. 
Rogoff, K. (1990), “Equilibrium political budget cycles”, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 
21–36. 
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988), “Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles”, Review of 
Economics Studies, 55, 1–16. 
20 
 
Sen, K. and R. R. Vaidya (1996), “Political Budget Cycles in India”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 30, pp. 2023-2027.  
Sengupta, B (2011), “Provision of public goods in a federal economy: The role of Party Politics”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, Vo. 27, pp. 104-119. 
Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2002a), “Political budget cycles in developed and developing 
countries” (mimeo), Development Research Group, World Bank. 
Shi, M. and J. Svensson(2002b), “Conditional political budget cycles” (mimeo), Development 
Research Group, World Bank 
Shi, M. And J. Svensson (2006), “Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and 
why?” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1367–1389. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1: Variables and Data Definitions 
Variables Data Sources Definitions and Details 
Grants from the Center 
(Gfc) 
1980-2010 
Ministry of Finance, RBI 
Grants given to states are 
one of the channel to transfer 
the fund processed through 
the Planning Commission 
Loan from the Center 
(Lfc) 
1980-2010 
Ministry of Finance, RBI 
Loan is also processed 
through the Planning 
commission. However, in 
this ca states are liable to 
pay back the loan. 
Grants in Aids (Gia) 
1980-2010 
Ministry of Finance, RBI 
This covers the assessed 
deficit on non-plan revenue 
account, after devolution of 
taxes and duties. I can also  
be recommended for the 
upgradation of the standard 
of administration of the 
states 
Finance Commission 
Transfers (Fct) 
1980-2010 
Ministry of Finance, RBI 
Finance Commission make 
transfer for various central 
sector and centrally 
sponsored schemes. 
Gross Devolution and 
Transfer of Resources 
from Center (Gdtr) 
1980-2010 
Ministry of Finance, RBI 
Devolution and other 
transfer of resources are 
done through the Finance 
Commission 
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Figure a(i): Grants from the Center (Gfc) 
 
 
Figure a(ii): Loan from the Center (Lfc) 
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 Figure a(iii): Grants in Aids (Gia) 
 
Figure a(iv): Finance Commission Transfer (Fct) 
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Figure a(v): Gross devolution and Transfer of Resources from the Center (Gd_tr) 
 
 
Table a(i): When Grants from the Center is one of the independent variables 
Variables 
Logit Model Probit Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnout 
0.13 
[4.57]*** 
0.13 
[4.56]*** 
0.13 
[4.56]*** 
0.13 
[4.56]*** 
0.08 
[4.74]*** 
0.08 
[4.76]*** 
0.08 
[4.72]*** 
0.08 
[4.72]*** 
Infs 
-0.08 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.07 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.07 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.93]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.02]*** 
Density 
-0.001 
[-0.99] 
-0.001 
[-0.99] 
-0.001 
[-1.01] 
-0.001 
[-0.99] 
-0.001 
[-0.95] 
-0.001 
[-0.96] 
-0.001 
[-0.98] 
-0.001 
[-0.95] 
Nypp 
0.028 
[2.53]** 
0.03 
[2.55]*** 
0.03 
[2.53]** 
0.03 
[2.46]** 
0.016 
[2.54]** 
0.017 
[2.56]** 
0.02 
[2.55]** 
0.02 
[2.47]** 
Gfc_ae 
-0.008 
[-0.35] 
-0.01 
[-0.43] 
-0.01 
[-0.42] 
-0.01 
[-0.34] 
-0.005 
[-0.37] 
-0.006 
[-0.44] 
-0.01 
[-0.45] 
-0.005 
[-0.36] 
Gfc_ae_ybe 
-0.006 
[-0.45] 
- - - 
-0.004 
[-0.40] 
- - - 
Gfc_ae_yae - 
0.002 
[0.17] 
- - - 
0.001 
[0.14] 
- - 
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Gfc_om_ybe - - 
0.01 
[0.12] 
- - - 0.01 
[0.15] 
- 
Gfc_om_yae - - - 
-0.01 
[-0.14] 
- - - 
-0.01 
[-0.14] 
Pi_Dum 
1.59 
[3.31]*** 
1.60 
[3.32]*** 
1.61 
[3.27]*** 
1.58 
[3.25]*** 
0.28 
[3.38]*** 
0.95 
[3.38]*** 
0.96 
[3.34]*** 
0.94 
[3.31]*** 
Cldum 
-0.337 
[-1.16] 
-0.35 
[-1.20] 
-0.35 
[-1.20] 
-0.34 
[-1.17] 
0.17 
[-1.16] 
-0.21 
[-1.19] 
-0.21 
[-1.19] 
-0.20 
[-1.16] 
Cl_al 
-0.85 
[-2.91]*** 
-zz0.84 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.84 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.84 
[-2.89]*** 
0.17 
[-3.02]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.0]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.00] 
-0.53 
[-3.00]*** 
Cons 
-7.60 
[-3.79]*** 
-7.59 
[-3.78]*** 
-7.57 
[-3.78]*** 
-7.60 
[-3.77]*** 
1.16 
[-3.88] 
-4.50 
[-3.87]*** 
-4.49 
[-3.87]*** 
-4.51 
[-3.86]*** 
#Obs 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Wald Chi2(9) 54.95 54.88 54.83 54.87 60.67 60.51 60.45 60.51 
LR Test 22.52 22.40 22.38 22.38 22.63 22.54 22.52 22.51 
Note-Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) Test. ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-
statistics in the parentheses). 
Table a(ii): When Loan from the Center is one of the independent variables 
Variables 
Logit Model Probit Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnout 
0.13 
[4.7]*** 
0.13 
[4.55]*** 
0.13 
[4.72]*** 
0.13 
[4.53]*** 
0.08 
[4.86]*** 
0.08 
[4.76]*** 
0.08 
[4.94]*** 
0.08 
[4.70]*** 
Infs 
-0.08 
[-3.12]*** 
-0.08 
[-3.00]*** 
-0.08 
[-3.21]*** 
-0.08 
[-3.03]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.18] 
-0.05 
[-3.09]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.31]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.13]*** 
Density 
-0.001 
[-0.46] 
-0.001 
[-0.59] 
-0.001 
[-0.51] 
-0.001 
[-0.70] 
-0.0003 
[-0.46] 
-0.001 
[-0.60] 
-0.0003 
[-0.47] 
-0.001 
[-0.72] 
Nypp 
0.04 
[3.08]*** 
0.04 
[3.05]*** 
0.04 
[3.16]*** 
0.03 
[3.10]*** 
0.02 
[3.08]*** 
0.02 
[3.06]*** 
0.02 
[3.22]*** 
0.02 
[3.00]*** 
Lfc_ae 
0.06 
[2.43]** 
0.04 
[1.64]* 
0.06 
[2.75]*** 
0.03 
[1.39] 
0.035 
[2.38]** 
0.02 
[1.57] 
0.04 
[2.77]*** 
0.02 
[1.32] 
Lfc_ae_ybe 
-0.03 
[-1.84]** - 
- - 
-0.02 
[-1.84]** - 
- - 
Lfc_ae_yae 
- 
0.011 
[0.60] 
- - - 
0.01 
[0.63] 
- - 
Lfc_om_ybe 
- 
- 
-0.23 
[-2.8]*** 
- - - 
-0.14  
[-2.97]*** 
- 
Lfc_om_yae 
- 
- - 
0.17 
[2.12]** 
- - - 
0.11 
[2.21]** 
Pi_Dum 
1.95 
[3.81]*** 
1.92 
[3.77]*** 
1.96 
[3.87]*** 
1.88 
[3.73]*** 
1.14 
[3.89]*** 
1.13 
[3.83] 
1.17 
[3.97]*** 
1.12 
[3.79]*** 
Cldum 
-0.08 
[-0.25] 
-0.19 
[-0.62] 
-0.06 
[-0.19] 
-0.20 
[-0.66] 
-0.05 
[-0.25] 
-0.12 
[-0.64] 
-0.03 
[-0.17] 
-0.12 
[-0.66] 
Cl_al 
-0.85 
[-2.91]*** 
-0.83 
[-2.84]*** 
-0.80 
[-2.74] 
-0.84 
[-2.87]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.00]*** 
-0.52 
[-2.94]*** 
-0.50 
[-2.84]*** 
-0.52 
[-2.99]*** 
Cons 
-8.96 
[-4.41]*** 
-8.50 
[-4.25]*** 
-8.98 
[-4.48]*** 
-8.28 
[-4.18]*** 
-5.30 
[-4.52]*** 
-5.03 
[-4.36]*** 
-5.43 
[-4.65]*** 
-4.89 
[-4.30]*** 
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#Obs 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Wald Chi2(9) 59.38 58.07 63.45 60.88 66.21 64.06 70.79 67.56 
LR Test 26.99 25.16 27.93 24.94 27.18 25.21 28.70 25.09 
Note-Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) Test. ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-
statistics in the parentheses). 
Table a(iii): When Grants in Aids from the Center is one of the independent variables 
Variables 
Logit Model Probit Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnout 
0.13 
[4.58]*** 
0.13 
[4.57]*** 
0.13 
[4.58]*** 
0.14 
[4.58]*** 
0.08 
[4.73]*** 
0.08 
[4.73]*** 
0.08 
[4.74] 
0.08 
[4.74]*** 
Infs 
-0.08 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.83]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.93]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.05 
[2.92]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.03]*** 
Density 
-0.001 
[-0.98] 
-0.001 
[-0.97] 
-0.001 
[-1.06] 
-0.001 
[-0.94] 
-0.001 
[-0.94] 
-0.001 
[-0.93] 
-0.001 
[-1.02] 
-0.001 
[-0.90] 
Nypp 
0.03 
[2.51]*** 
0.03 
[2.53]** 
0.03 
[2.64]*** 
0.03 
[2.42]** 
0.016 
[2.52]** 
0.017 
[2.54]** 
0.02 
[2.66]*** 
0.02 
[2.42]** 
Gia_ae 
-0.007 
[-0.27] 
-0.008 
[-0.13] 
-0.012 
[-0.48] 
-0.004 
[-0.15] 
-0.004 
[-0.28] 
-0.005 
[-0.31] 
-0.01 
[-0.49] 
-0.003 
[-0.16] 
Gia_ae_ybe 
-0.01 
[-0.36] 
- - - 
-0.003 
[-0.30] 
- - - 
Gia_ae_yae - 
0.002 
[0.16] 
- - - 0.001 
[0.13] 
- - 
Gia_om_ybe - - 
0.05 
[0.75] 
- - - 0.03 
[0.77] 
- 
Gia_om_yae - - - -0.02853 - - - 
-0.02 
[-0.36] 
Pi_Dum 
1.60 
[3.31]*** 
1.61 
[3.32]*** 
1.69 
[3.41]*** 
1.57 
[3.22] 
0.95 
[3.38]*** 
0.95 
[3.39]*** 
1.01 
[3.48]*** 
0.93 
[3.28]*** 
Cldum 
-0.34 
[-1.18] 
-0.35 
[-1.21] 
-0.35 
[-1.19] 
-0.34 
[-1.15] 
-0.21 
[-1.18] 
-0.21 
[-1.21] 
-0.21 
[-1.19] 
-0.20 
[-1.14] 
Cl_al 
-0.85 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.84 
[-2.89] 
-0.85 
[-2.19]*** 
-0.84 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.01]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.00]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.02]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.00]*** 
Cons 
-7.64 
[-3.80]*** 
-7.64 
[-3.79]*** 
-7.65 
[-3.82]*** 
-7.72 
[-3.79]*** 
-4.53 
[-3.88]*** 
-4.54 
[-3.87]*** 
-4.54 
[-3.91]*** 
-4.58 
[-3.87]*** 
#Obs 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Wald Chi2(9) 54.85 54.83 54.99 54.90 60.55 60.46 60.69 60.56 
LR Test 22.64 22.57 22.54 22.71 22.73 22.68 22.68 22.82 
Note-Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) Test. ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-
statistics in the parentheses). 
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Table a(iv): When Finance Commission Transfer is one of the independent variables 
Variables 
Logit Model Probit Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnout 
0.14 
[4.63]*** 
0.13 
[4.62]*** 
0.15 
[4.85]*** 
0.135313 
0.08 
[4.79]*** 
0.08 
[4.78]*** 
0.086 
[5.02] 
0.08 
[4.79]*** 
Infs 
-0.08 
[-2.88]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.86]*** 
-0.066 
[-2.51]** 
-0.08 
[-2.94] 
-0.05 
[-2.97]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.95]*** 
-0.039 
[-2.53]** 
-0.050 
[-3.04]*** 
Density 
-0.001 
[-0.90] 
-0.0011 
[-0.90] 
-0.001 
[-0.79] 
-0.001 
[-0.96] 
-0.001 
[-0.87] 
-0.001 
[-0.86] 
-0.0006 
[-0.74] 
-0.0007 
[-0.92] 
Nypp 
0.03 
[2.51]** 
0.03 
[2.53]** 
0.03 
[2.89]*** 
0.028 
[2.49]*** 
0.016 
[2.51]** 
0.017 
[2.54]*** 
0.019 
[2.88]*** 
0.020 
[2.48]** 
Fct_ae 
-0.002 
[-0.14] 
-0.003 
[-0.18] 
-0.01 
[-0.73] 
-0.0003 
[-0.02] 
-0.0012 
[-0.12] 
-0.002 
[-0.17] 
-0.007 
[-0.67] 
-5.3E-05 
[-0.01] 
Fct_ae_ybe 
-0.003 
[-0.36] 
- - - 
-0.0015 
[-0.32] 
- - - 
Fct_ae_yae - 
0.002 
[0.23] 
- - - 
0.001 
[0.22] 
- - 
Fct_om_ybe - - 
0.19 
[3.18]*** 
- - - 
0.112 
[3.21]*** 
- 
Fct_om_yae - - - 
-0.04 
[-0.59] 
- - - 
-0.024 
[-0.60] 
Pi_Dum 
1.60 
[3.31]*** 
1.61 
[3.32]*** 
1.99 
[3.95]*** 
1.59 
[3.29]*** 
0.95 
[3.38]*** 
0.96 
[3.38] 
1.18 
[4.05]*** 
0.95 
[3.35]*** 
Cldum 
-0.34 
[-1.17] 
-0.35 
[-1.21] 
-0.35 
[-1.18] 
-0.33 
[-1.14] 
-0.20 
[-1.17] 
-0.21 
[-1.20] 
-0.211 
[-1.19] 
-0.20 
[-1.14] 
Cl_al 
-0.86 
[-2.91]*** 
-0.85 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.90 
[-3.02]*** 
-0.85 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.02]*** 
-0.53 
[-3.01]*** 
-0.56 
[-3.11]*** 
-0.53 
[-2.99]*** 
Cons 
-7.76 
[-3.91]*** 
-7.75 
[-3.90]*** 
-8.37 
[-4.15]*** 
-7.78 
[-3.91]*** 
-4.60 
[-3.99]*** 
-4.60 
[-3.98] 
-4.95 
[-4.24] 
-4.62 
[-3.99]*** 
#Obs 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Wald Chi2(9) 54.86 54.85 60.75 55.05 60.58 60.49 68.20 60.75 
LR Test 25.06 24.96 27.80 24.96 25.21 25.13 27.77 25.19 
Note-Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) Test. ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-
statistics in the parentheses). 
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Table a(v): When Gross Devolution and Transfer of Resources from the Center is one of the 
independent variables 
Variables 
Logit Model Probit Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnout 
0.14 
[4.72]*** 
0.13 
[4.68]*** 
0.135 
[4.67]*** 
0.133 
[4.62]*** 
0.08 
[4.88]*** 
0.080 
[4.83]*** 
0.08 
[4.83]*** 
0.079 
[4.78]*** 
Infs 
-0.08 
[-2.92]*** 
-0.08 
[-2.90]*** 
-0.078 
[-2.87]*** 
-0.077 
[-2.88]*** 
-0.05 
[-3.01]*** 
-0.05 
[-2.99]*** 
-0.047 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.047 
[-2.99]*** 
Density 
-0.0011 
[-0.87] 
-0.001 
[-0.88] 
-0.0012 
[-0.90] 
-0.0011 
[-0.85] 
-0.001 
[-0.83] 
-0.001 
[-0.85] 
-0.0007 
[-0.87] 
-0.001 
[-0.82] 
Nypp 
0.030 
[2.63]*** 
0.031 
[2.67]*** 
0.030 
[2.68]*** 
0.031 
[2.70]*** 
0.020 
[2.63]*** 
0.018 
[2.67]*** 
0.018 
[2.67]*** 
0.018 
[2.70]*** 
Gdtr_ae 
0.020 
[1.17] 
0.014 
[0.97] 
0.013 
[0.87] 
0.011 
[0.71] 
0.010 
[1.13] 
0.008 
[0.93] 
0.007 
[0.84] 
0.006 
[0.67] 
Gdtr_ae_ybe 
-0.005 
[-0.84] 
- - - 
-0.003 
[-0.82] 
- - - 
Gdtr_ae_yae - 
0.002 
[0.31] 
- - - 
0.001 
[0.32] 
- - 
Gdtr_om_ybe - - 
0.026 
[0.58] 
- - - 
0.015 
[0.55] 
- 
Gdtr_om_yae - - - 
0.056 
[1.08] 
- -  
0.034 
[1.10] 
Pi_Dum 
1.80 
[3.52]*** 
1.79 
[3.51]*** 
1.82 
[3.54]*** 
1.77 
[3.51]*** 
1.056 
[3.58]*** 
1.057 
[3.57]*** 
1.07 
[3.6]*** 
1.050 
[3.57]*** 
Cldum 
-0.266 
[-0.89] 
-0.30 
[-1.00] 
-0.30 
[-1.02] 
-0.33 
[-1.09] 
-0.162 
[-0.90] 
-0.18 
[-1.01] 
-0.184 
[-1.03] 
-0.19 
[-1.09] 
Cl_al 
-0.83 
[-2.82]*** 
-0.82 
[-2.79]*** 
-0.83 
[-2.81]*** 
-0.83 
[-2.83]*** 
-0.515 
[-2.91]*** 
-0.51 
[-2.89]*** 
-0.52 
[-2.91]*** 
-0.52 
[-2.94]*** 
Cons 
-8.66 
[-4.14]*** 
-8.50 
[-4.10]*** 
-8.47 
[-4.08] 
-8.29 
[-4.01]*** 
-5.12 
[-4.23]*** 
-5.04 
[-4.18] 
-5.003 
[-4.16]*** 
-4.91 
[-4.09]*** 
#Obs 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 
Wald Chi2(9) 56.09 55.78 55.69 56.62 62.00 61.46 61.50 62.46 
LR Test 27.07 26.48 26.33 26.04 27.18 26.61 26.41 26.11 
Note-Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2 (01) Test. ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (z-
statistics in the parentheses). 
 
 
 
  
